Introduction
Despite all the years of electoral research in Russia, nationalization of the Russia's party system remains a relatively unexplored topic. Most scholars have paid attention towards general structural features of the party system delving into the matters such as competition, and ideological cleavages. The very concept of electoral space has become widely spread in Russian studies with different methods (both quantitative and qualitative) and implications (Akhremenko 2007; Akhremenko 2008) . Analysis of party system in time-space continuum has been partial and often dedicated to the structure of the Russia's electoral space. Hence, one of the most developed topics in Russia's electoral studies, that is electoral geography, covering spatial features of electoral support, their patterns, and reasons (Taylor, Johnston 1979) . In our view, dynamic spatial model of electoral space should combine electoral geography and temporal volatility of electoral support. While electoral geography focuses mainly on the description of spatial electoral patterns and traces causal links explaining how different social cleavages translate into their spatial representations in the elections, studies of nationalization create an ample analytical framework (Turovsky 2016) .
Nationalization is a general feature of a party system, which implies both the current state of the national party system and its spatial structure. It considers the spatial homogeneity of parties' activities and electoral support in the regions and usually sees homogeneity as an indicator of ripeness and consolidation in party system. That is why nationalization and regionalization (sometimes but not necessarily as its contrary feature, see Turovsky 2016) serve as a framework for this analysis, where we track the development of the Russia's party system in the evolving electoral space. Obviously, we do not see nationalization as a predestined and only positive historic development since the party system can move back towards more regionalization under certain circumstances or change from time to time in these terms.
Nationalization of Russia's party system: fluctuations in a unified social system
Studies of nationalization use very many different indices (Caramani 2004; Kasuya, Moenius 2008) . Empirical tests let us to the conclusion that two indices looked the most appropriate, both with their advantages and flaws. One of them is Gini-based Party nationalization score (PNS) while another is variance coefficient (VC). Both are calculated for every party (or candidate) and measure the dispersion of regional breakdown of the electoral results. The advantage of PNS is that it also allows measuring the index for the whole party system such as Party system nationalization score (PSNS). Besides PNS and PSNS have a strict 4 and clear upper limit at 1 as long as the lowest limit at 0 (Jones, Mainwaring 2003) . However Gini index seems more appropriate for the studies of social differences (where it comes from) having much bigger magnitude there as compared with most electoral regional breakdowns which are more humble in terms of diversity. This is why PNS usually is closer to its upper limit (meaning small differences) and do not fluctuate much it time. VC is criticized for not having its upper limit and it is a bit harder for interpretation. But it gives more vivid picture in terms of differences among the parties and in temporal developments. The problem of upper limit is not too serious as VC rarely exceeds 1.
The State Duma elections in 2016 have become a new step in the process of nationalization in Russia's party system. As in most party systems, nationalization should not be considered a one-track development (towards more nationalization or just stabilized forever at a certain level). Rather it is a dynamic process with its ups and downs. It is particularly strange to expect that the nationalization will only rise in the developing party systems where new players may appear and disappear.
Russian case is particularly interesting to study nationalization of party system. Russia has started to develop its multiparty system after many decades of one-party regime, which was producing a high degree of ideological unity. In the huge and rather heterogeneous space, this could lead to the upsurge of all the social, cultural, and regional differences hidden under the cover of the Soviet regime. But as we will prove later the relative homogeneity of Russia's electoral space appeared instead, contrasting all the typical assumptions about the vastness of Russia as seemingly (but a bit wrongly) synonymous to its diversity. Probably we do not have to underestimate the Soviet legacy with its not only ideological but also cultural unification of the Soviet people along with the ethnic assimilation under predominance of Russian culture.
Moreover, this is not just Soviet but imperial legacy dating back to the Russian Empire where cultural assimilation was all but official policy of the regime. It is often said that the ethnic nationalism was an inevitable reaction to the breakdown of the Soviet system with nationalism coming to the fore as a substitute for communism and new mode of ideological unification of society. But in the core of the former empire (in the area of modern Russian Federation) regionalism and ethnic nationalism have not proved to be so strong to blow the formerly unified territory to pieces. about the decisive role of Russia's extreme diversity. We can see that PSNS for presidential elections was a bit higher than for the parliamentary ones ( fig. 1 ). This can be explained by the usual presence of the dominant player (an incumbent or quasi-incumbent such as Yeltsin as a chair of the Russia's Supreme Soviet in the first presidential elections in 1991). PSNS in presidential elections has started on the high level at 0.8 in 1991 and was lower only once, in the highly competitive elections in 1996 when an incumbent lost his popularity giving the way to more regional cleavages. The spatial unity was restored then with the election of Putin reaching highest PSNS numbers in 2008 (the election of Medvedev) and 2012 (the third election of Putin).
But it is not only about dominant player since other candidates also demonstrated rather even level of support all over the state.
PSNS in parliamentary elections shows a bit more regional diversity but it remains high. Again, we see that the post-Soviet development is not towards more or less nationalization but changes its direction regularly (but not crucially). The level of nationalization was significant from the very beginning. It is interesting that without any dominant party it was rather high in the very first election in 1993 and dropped down then. With the coming of "United Russia" as a dominant party, the previous level of nationalization was restored again and peaked in 2007, along with the highest electoral result ever achieved by "United Russia". Two waves of PSNS decrease in 1995 and 2011 clearly coincide with two waves of electoral protest bringing about more diversity in the regional support of different parties, both loyal to the Kremlin and oppositional.
The analysis of PSNS proves that Russia's electoral space is rather integrated. On the level of national party system, we see the prevalence of more or less strong federal-level actors while regional-based and ethnic nationalist parties have not achieved popularity. This also proves that the previous social and cultural unification was strong enough to prevent regionalism and nationalism to tear the Russia's space apart. In such spatial system the regions did not produce many own parties and proto-party groups. Rather they responded (however with very different enthusiasm) to the appeals of different centre-based ideologically biased or personalist parties. In other words, most of the elements of Russia's space were searching for an alternative to the late Soviet regime looking at the programs and leaders of the biggest national parties but not for any separatist substitutes. In addition, the role of unified communication space proved to be high from the very beginning and even before the Internet. The attention of the people to the central media being another common feature of the Soviet regime remained significant too. For that reason, it was possible to perform greatly in the elections without developed network of party branches and supporters in the regions. An example of Zhirinovsky and LDPR proved it many times starting in 1991 and 1993.
The rise of regionalism in the 1995 Duma elections was also the heyday of a number of weak yet regionalist movements, which quickly dissolved later. That temporary and weak regionalism was a momentary reaction to the unpopularity of the federal government. Instead, two most persistent parties born in the 1990s such as CPRF and LDPR managed to become national parties with the significant support in most of the regions. Sure, the electoral space has become more consolidated with the creation of "United Russia". But it also should be mentioned that the predecessors of "United Russia" were far from the status of truly national parties and rather acted as the agents of regionalization being supported by specific groups of regional elites.
Surprisingly or not but it was the elite (both federal and regional) which used to split the electoral space creating political movements with strictly localized support. Despite many changes in the structure of electoral actors in the analysis we can easily focus on such constant actors as bureaucratic (elite-based) "parties of power" ("Our Home is Russia", "Fatherland -All Russia", and "United Russia In this paper, regionalization score is simply Gini index as different from PNS (which is calculated as 1 -Gini index). We use regionalization score in this paper to make the graphs visually comparable (because higher regionalization scores relate to higher variance coefficients).
Bureaucratic "parties of power" are Party of Russian Unity and Concord in 1993, "Our Home is Russia" in 1995, "Fatherland -All Russia" in 1999, "United Russia" then. The most important change in Russia's nationalization came from the elite-based centrist or centre-right parties commonly known as "parties of power". While being aimed at representing most of Russia's ruling elites these parties initially were no more than a coalition of an important high-ranking federal politician and a bunch of regional governors. In the time of deep elite cleavages in the 1990s such parties in fact became main agents of regionalization however without any such intentions. But at the same time it is very symptomatic that the centrist / "catch-all" electoral actors started to create their zones of support with the help of local mobilization introduced more and more firmly by ruling regional elites. This process led to more regionalization in its beginning since the elites' coalitions covered only parts of Russia. This is why "Our Home is Russia" produced much localized support in 1995. "Fatherland -All Russia" did even worse in these terms despite a bit better national result. Moreover, its result was so localized that "Fatherland -All Russia" appeared to be the only significant party in Russia making its VC exceed 1. In fact this party (and elites' split of course) was "to blame" for the fact that in 1999 nationalization of Russia's party system did not grow strongly and remained less than in 1993. On the contrary, "Unity" was much more nationalized but we do not count it as a "party of power" in its full sense because it did not intend to mobilize and unite elites in the course of 1999 elections rather appealing directly to electorate. And this centre-based appeal radiating to the regions through the federal media appeared to be more efficient in terms of nationalization.
Creation of "United Russia" has become a turning point both in the imposed unification of Russian elites and in the role of "party of power' in nationalization of party system. Moving away from the groups of local elites with spatially fragmented electoral support the new "party of power" has become true and strongest agent of nationalization. In this sense, "United Russia" reached its peak in 2007 with PNS more than 0.9 and VC less than 0.2. With the protests of 2011, spatial support of "United Russia" became more fragmented and the scores we track went down again. It is interesting in terms of methodology that PNS was not sensitive to this change Speaking about presidential incumbents, we have to underscore their crucial role in the consolidation of Russia's electoral space ( fig. 4 and 5, tab. 3 and 4). While "parties of power" were failing in these efforts in the 1990s, Yeltsin was much more successful. High level of Yeltsin's nationalization score was the starting point of Russian democratic elections themselves.
It fell a bit in 1996 (especially if measured by VC) but was returned to its highs by Putin and Medvedev (both delivering more nationalization than Yeltsin ever did). It is very important to mention that the popular leading presidential candidates in the plebiscitarian-style elections always played the principal role in Russia's nationalization. The main and only drawback was in At the same time, the story of CPRF as an agent of nationalization reveals a problem in methodology of such studies. The essence of this problem derives from the fact that a strong actor is not exactly the one which is well nationalized. On the contrary, it can rely on the regions with very high electoral support but such regions tear apart the electoral space of the state.
Therefore, the nationalization scores of CPRF were almost constantly increasing for all Duma elections but the support of the party was changing in both directions at the same time. In 1993 and 1995 the formation of "red belts" made CPRF look strong enough but the scores of nationalization were average and definitely not high. More or less similar level of regional support had been achieved by CPRF by the 1999 elections when it got its highest electoral result.
After Putin came to power, CPRF has lost many votes but remained an important agent of nationalization (with PNS at 0.8 or exceeding, but with VC more than 0.3, which means medium-level nationalization rather than high). Elections in 2016 did not bring any change to this situation as PNS stayed exactly the same (0.82) and VC went up just by 0.01 (from 0.32 to 0.33).
As for the presidential incumbents, the influence and popularity of the leader was an important factor of nationalization in the case of CPRF too. Zyuganov's presidential campaign helped the left to improve their support but the scores of nationalization for CPRF and Zyuganov were very similar. All in all scores of CPRF and its presidential candidates follow the same path. Despite all the changes, left ideology in Russia remains one the main factors of nationalization. However, its popularity not only changes in time but also differs from region to
region. An example of CPRF shows that this party can be considered an agent of nationalization but its scores are not very high. The radical left and left-nationalist forces have average scores meaning that some areas can be quite favorable for them but these parties are unable to create significant support in most of the regions.
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As different from the left, the liberal ideology failed to become an agent of nationalization. Rather it produced very uneven regional support highly localized in bigger cities.
As years gone by this situation has not improved but become even worse. In Yabloko case, the electoral support of this party was in continuous decline since 1993 and only the 2011 elections gave a sudden but very short rise. In our scale of nationalization scores Yabloko got better results Thus, all liberal parties and candidates failed to achieve high levels of nationalization, as their support was mainly concentrated in big cities. When these actors managed to organize a strong campaign, this led to more spatial integrity but still it was no more than leaving the zone of high regionalization.
LDPR as a specific Russian phenomenon of a populist party with nationalist standings looks more nationalized and we consider it the third-ranking nationalization agent after United Russia and CPRF. A problem, which leads to more regionalization in the case of LDPR, is its Finally, "Just Russia" which started its federal campaigning in 2007 failed to achieve high nationalization scores. Its support was clearly tied to local elites and strong and popular regional activists and it could not be enough. The 2016 Duma elections marked decline of this party, which became an agent of regionalization similar to liberal parties.
Our analysis of nationalization in Russia' party system reveals the changing role of centrist "parties of power". Before the formation of "United Russia", such parties were rather agents of regionalization due to very uneven support from local elites (with an important exception of "Unity" the success of which was not grounded in local elites' support). But when the regional elites were unified and started to support "United Russia" literally everywhere, "party of power" has turned into the leading agent of nationalization. This process was enforced with the advent of Putin and his (and Medvedev's) presidential campaigns. Its precursor, however, can be found in the first Yeltsin's campaign in 1991 followed by the wave of protestbiased regionalization in the middle of the 1990s. Importantly, the regionalization was not a starting point of post-Soviet party system but rather its temporary response to the loss of Yeltsin's popularity and disappointment with the liberal reforms. In the 2016 Duma elections, the role of "United Russia" in nationalization was reconfirmed after the small-scale protestdriven regionalization in 2011.
The level of Russia's regionalization is not very high. It is better to say that it is higher than could be expected in such a vast and multiethnic space. Long before "United Russia" appeared, CPRF and LDPR played an important role both in creation of Russia's party system and its nationalization. On the contrary, liberal forces and then "Just Russia" did not manage to "nationalize" Russia's electoral space. Their support remained too fragmented for this and it did not improve with years. Last Duma elections showed that Yabloko and "Just Russia" moved towards even more regionalization leaving three main parties unchallenged in this sense.
Regional outliers: how many and where?
The analysis of nationalization scores gives only the general picture of electoral space and party system. To understand it on the regional level we use the calculation of "Euclid distance" (ED) which shows the virtual distance between a specific region and the national result (Turovsky 2016 ). This method is especially interesting in defining most deviant and typical regions, the former characterized by the "longest" ED while the latter deliver results most close to the state totals. One of the problems in ED measurement in electoral studies is the lack of the scale, which would translate plain figures into substantial assumptions. Empirically and being based on Russia's experience we decided to call the regions with ED more than 20 deviant while regions with ED less than 5 are counted as typical.
Certainly, it is not sufficient just to name deviant and typical regions. The topic of deviant regions is most interesting because such regions can be potential threats for not only party system but also political integrity of the state. One can expect that the deviant regions are most peculiar in terms of their political culture, ethnic composition, economy and so on. In Russia, ethnic and religious cleavages can be the main reason for deviations. Another reason is centreperiphery cleavage, which differentiates administrative capitals and centers of social and political innovations from rural areas. One can also consider the factor of geographic distance from the centre as a possible precursor of electoral deviations. Besides, the deviant regions may be able to create their own party systems based on regional and ethnic parties. Apart from the political geography of deviant regions, important is their number (or share in a number of state's administrative units). If this share is large, this is dangerous for the integrity of the state. On the contrary, the fair share of typical regions means political stability.
In party systems with dominant party such as Russia's, deviant regions split into two distinctively different groups. One group is loyal deviation, which marks the regions with extremely high support for the authorities. On the other hand, the oppositional deviation characterizes the regions with the highest support for the opposition. Before the system with dominant party was created, deviant regions in Russia could appear as both most pro-liberal and pro-communist, or because of extremely high support of any of the specific parties.
Overall analysis of ED in Russia proves once again that ethnic cleavage is the most important one in its electoral space. Ethnic regions make up the most persistent part on the list of deviant regions. It is very important to mention that ethnic regions have always been deviant despite all the changes in party system. From recently they tend to loyal deviation. But before
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"United Russia" appeared, such regions could cling in vast majorities of their voters to other parties, usually communists but not only them.
It is hardly surprising that the electoral deviation is usual in ethnic regions with the lowest shares of Russian-speaking population and the most distinctive own religion and culture. These 
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However, searching for the Russia's "New Hampshire" is hardly fruitful. Probably Russia's party system is too new and not so stable to produce any long-term typical regions.
Usually typical regions are purely Russian speaking and come from the European part of the state (Central and Volga macroregions). Under United Russia's dominated party system, two neighboring regions have appeared to be most typical recently. These are Kursk and Belgorod regions falling into this category in three subsequent campaigns (2007, 2011, and 2016) . Besides, Stavropol region has been typical two times in a row, in 2011 and 2016. In terms of geography, all the regions, which were typical in the 2016 elections, could be found either in Central Russia (Kursk, Belgorod, Tula, and Ryazan) or in Volga and Southern regions (Stavropol, Volgograd, Samara, Udmurtia). The only exception was a newcomer Sevastopol but it also can be considered a southern region.
Change and Continuity in Territorial Patterns
The structural volatility of Russia's electoral space can be measured with the help of correlations between territorial patterns of voting in different elections (Turovsky 2016 ). For each party or a group of electoral actors the territorial pattern may change from election to election and its stability marks both the degree of party's institutionalization (the topic beyond this paper) and the character of its nationalization. Changing territorial patterns of voting for each party is an indicator of what we call the dynamic nationalization. In our opinion, the genuine nationalization presupposes not only high nationalization scores but also stable territorial pattern of voting. Using this approach, we can be sure that the relatively low territorial heterogeneity of voting coincides with the voting of the same core electorates living in the same areas.
To measure dynamic nationalization we can use two different techniques. One of them is based on the correlations between following elections (we call it a "chain" of regional volatility, tab. 5). Another method measures correlations between a certain electoral campaign (for example, the last one) and all the previous campaigns (we call it a "path" of regional volatility, tab. 6). Therefore, the analysis of dynamic nationalization raises the question of the role of regional change and continuity, which can unmask serious volatility hidden behind seemingly "good" nationalization scores. CPRF is an example, which makes the vision of Russia's nationalization more complicated. At least we cannot say for sure that the influence of CPRF in this process is very high.
All this makes us think again about the role of LDPR. Support of LDPR has very serious gap in Russia's republics, which makes LDPR less nationalized. However, in the ethnic Russian regions LDPR looks quite stable. Our analysis of dynamic nationalization shows that LDPR's territorial pattern had formed by 1999 and it has been stable since 2003. LDPR even keeps relatively good correlation with the 1993 elections. It looks like LDPR quickly found its niche in Russia's electoral space being party of premier choice for the dissatisfied voters in the Northern and Eastern regions of Russia. While the party system changes, this niche remains intact and no other party could successfully push LDPR out of it. In other words, LDPR has contributed to the nationalization of Russia's party system nor less significantly than CPRF.
In difference with LDPR, a case of Yabloko gives results that are more controversial. On one hand, this party is much localized and cannot be considered an agent of nationalization. On the other hand, its fragmented territorial pattern is very stable by itself and replicated all the time.
Yabloko is the only one of the "old" parties with high correlation scores even with the 1993 elections. However, its contemporary territorial pattern was formed in 2007 and 2011 when the electoral results became tiny as compared with the 1990s. The most significant change of spatial pattern happened in 1995.
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Despite the similar localization of voting for the right liberals, frequent change of parties and their electoral outcomes cannot produces the same stable pattern that Yabloko keeps. As one may expect the best was the continuity for "The Union of Right Forces", which three times participated in the federal elections. PARNAS in 2016 produced territorial pattern close to the one of "The Right Cause" in the 2011 elections.
Finally, we conclude that "Just Russia" failed to form the territorial pattern similar in its stability to those of other parties presented in the State Duma now. In 2016, this pattern has become even less stable. In conclusion, "Rodina" ("Motherland") which used to be one of constituent parts of "Just Russia" poorly replicated in 2016 its pattern of successful 2003 (Pearson at 0.235* and Spearman at 0.5***).
Thus, the contemporary territorial pattern of the Russia's voting appeared with the formation of the current party system dominated by "United Russia". After the consolidation of regional elites under its banner, "United Russia" became the main factor of electoral space's stability. Among the new parties, "Just Russia" has failed to create similarly stable pattern. At the same time, "United Russia" influenced upon the territorial pattern of CPRF, which is continuously changing producing contradiction between its rather even geography in every election and changes of this geography from one election to another. From this point LDPR is formally less "nationalized" than CPRF but manages to keep much more stable territorial pattern. Finally, although the territorial pattern of voting has mostly been formed after the 2003 elections, some significant traces of pro-liberal and pro-LDPR patterns appeared in the 1990s remain.
